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Knowledge and Justified True Belief 
I believe that a man named René Descartes wrote the Meditations on First Philosophy. 
Knowledge requires belief: if I do not believe that Descartes is the author of the 
Meditations, I do not know it. Knowledge also requires truth: if it turns out that Descartes 
never wrote the Meditations, I might think I know that Descartes wrote the Meditations, 
but I would not in fact know this. 
 Having a true belief is not, however, sufficient for knowledge. I might believe that 
Descartes is the author of the Meditations because I heard it from Harry, despite the fact 
that trustworthy sources have told me that Harry is a pathological liar. My belief, though 
true, would not be knowledge. Or suppose I believe that there is an even number of stars 
in our galaxy, but only because I like even numbers and, irrationally, think that the 
universe is constructed to my liking. Or I might believe it for no reason at all—it might 
simply be the result of a brain malfunction or of getting hit on the head. Even if this 
belief is true, it does not count as knowledge. So, true belief is not sufficient for 
knowledge.  
What else does knowledge require? As some epistemologists put it, the above 
beliefs are “unjustified” or “unwarranted.”  It is difficult to deny that, intuitively, there is 
some positive property that is missing in my initial examples and others. Beliefs that 
result from mere wishful thinking, fear, biases, or hasty generalization are intuitively not 
justified, not warranted, not well-founded, or not epistemically proper, even if they 
happen to be true. Moreover, beliefs based on careful observation and good reasoning are 
intuitively justified, warranted, well-founded, or proper, even if they happen to be false. 
There seems to be some positive property (whether we call it “justification” or something 
else) that the former beliefs lack and the latter beliefs have, that is necessary for 
knowledge. However, these terms seem to be little more than placeholders for whatever 
is missing from such cases. Indeed, the term “warrant” is sometimes used in 
epistemology to stand for whatever condition(s) must be satisfied in order for a true belief 
to count as knowledge. We need a more informative and illuminating account.  
Here’s a start. We just saw that the mere truth or falsity of a belief does not 
determine whether the belief has or lacks the positive property. But we should not 
conclude from this that justification has nothing to do with truth. Indeed, the reason the 
initial cases of true belief above do not count as knowledge is that such beliefs are not 
related, in the right sort of way, to the truth. This is only a start, though, for the 
interesting question is what counts as the “right sort of way.” Nevertheless, it helps us 
frame the debate between the internalist and the externalist. Let us take the justification 
of a belief to stand for this property that a belief must have for it to count as knowledge, a 
property involving some appropriate relation to the truth of one’s belief. We can now 
understand the internalist/externalist debate as a disagreement about what this property 
requires. Whether epistemologists actually use the term “justification” or some other term 
to refer to this sort of property does not matter.   
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Roughly, according to the internalist, having a justified belief requires that 
something relevant to the truth, or probable truth, of one’s belief must be internal to, or 
accessible from, the subject’s first-person perspective.  More specifically, the subject 
must have first-person access to good grounds or evidence for belief—that is, reasons to 
think that the belief is (probably) true.  A natural way to think of the internalist view is to 
say that it identifies justification with rationality. Intuitively, a belief of mine is rational 
only if I have some good reason to think it is true, and I can have such a reason only if I 
have some sort of internal access to it. The internalist claims that the above beliefs are not 
justified because they are not rational. My belief that Descartes wrote the Meditations is 
based on bad grounds, the testimony of someone I have good reasons not to trust; my 
belief that there is an even number of stars is based on another irrational belief, or has no 
basis at all (because it is due to a brain malfunction). 
For the externalist, something about the belief or the way it is formed must be 
appropriately related to the truth for the belief to be justified. There must be some non-
accidental connection—some lawful, causal, or other probabilistic connection—to the 
truth of what one believes. But the subject need not have first-person access to grounds to 
think there is such a connection.1 Perhaps the subject has access to good grounds for 
belief in some cases, but, says the externalist, it is not strictly and always needed for 
justification or knowledge. In this paper, I defend a form of internalism.2  
The internalist-externalist controversy is complicated by the Gettier problem. I 
would like to briefly discuss this problem before clarifying and defending my view. 
Edmund Gettier argued quite persuasively that justified true belief is not sufficient for 
knowledge.3 To use one of Gettier’s own examples: I might be justified in believing that 
Jones owns a Ford, which would also justify me in believing something this entails: that 
either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. But suppose, despite my having 
excellent reasons to believe that Jones owns a Ford, he actually doesn’t, and it just so 
happens that Brown is in Barcelona. The belief would be a justified true belief, but not 
knowledge. Or consider a different example: I believe, on the basis of looking at my 
watch, that it is 10 p.m. I have very good reasons to trust it. But my watch is just stuck 
and has been stuck for 24 hours without me noticing. I have a justified true belief, but not 
knowledge.4 Thus, even if knowledge requires justified true belief, these conditions are 
not sufficient for knowledge.  
Where does this leave us with respect to the internalist-externalist debate? The 
internalist might say that knowledge still requires access to good reasons. The Gettier 
cases don’t give us a reason to reject that, though they arguably do show that something 
more is required. For example, perhaps there needs to be some sort of non-accidental 																																																								1	For	a	highly	influential	defense	of	a	view	of	this	sort,	see	Alvin	Goldman’s “What is Justified Belief?” 
in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1979), 1-25. 2	I	defend	a	form	of	“access	internalism”	according	to	which	justification	depends	essentially	on	the	reasons	one	has	access	to.	It	should	be	distinguished	from	“mentalism”	or	“internal	state	internalism,”	according	to	which	one’s	justification	depends	only	on	what	is	mental	or	inside	the	mind	(e.g.,	experiences	and	other	mental	states,	and	relations	between	these	states).	I	do	not	have	space	here	to	discuss	mentalism	and	its	relation	to	access	internalism.		3	Edmund	Gettier,	“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23:6 (1963): 121–3. 	4	Bertrand	Russell	gave	a	similar	example	to	show	that	true	belief	is	not	sufficient	for	knowledge,	though	it	works	just	as	well	to	show	that	justified	true	belief	is	not	sufficient	for	knowledge.		See	his	
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 70.  	
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connection between one’s evidence for the belief and its truth, a connection that is 
typically if not always inaccessible to the subject. It’s important to see that internalists 
can and typically do accept that what we might call “external conditions” are necessary 
for knowledge. Let us define an external condition relative to the subject’s belief that p as 
any condition that could fail to obtain even when the subject has access to good grounds 
for believing that p. The truth of one’s belief is, at least typically, an external condition. 
The existence of a non-accidental connection between my reasons and the truth of my 
belief might also be an external condition.  Contemporary internalists accept that some 
external conditions are necessary for knowledge, but they deny that external conditions 
are sufficient for knowledge. Alternatively, the internalist might accept a form of 
“infallibilism” about knowledge: knowledge requires a kind of absolute certainty; our 
justification must guarantee the truth of what we believe. I want to leave open what 
further condition might be required for knowledge, including whether knowledge 
requires some kind of certainty or infallibility. My focus will be on whether or not we can 
dispense with the requirement of access to reasons. 
The externalist claims that knowledge does not require belief based on internally 
accessible grounds. We should replace the internalist requirement with some strong, 
objective connection to the truth or probability of the belief. If there is a solution to the 
Gettier problem, it lies in finding the right combination of external conditions to avoid 
further counterexamples. However, coming up with the right conditions remains a 
significant challenge, even for the externalist. And if externalists come up with “Gettier-
proof” conditions, internalists can build these external conditions into the account of 
knowledge, but still insist on an internalist account of epistemic justification. The Gettier 
problem thus seems to have little to do with the internalist-externalist debate.5  
 
Internalism 
According to the sort of internalist account I am defending here, knowledge requires 
justified belief, where a belief that p is justified if and only if the subject (a) has good, 
accessible grounds or evidence for believing that p, (b) believes that p on the basis of 
these grounds, and (c) does not have “defeaters”—i.e., good grounds to think p is false, or 
that the source of the belief is unreliable.   
By “good grounds” for believing that p, I mean good reasons to believe that p, 
where the reasons are epistemic reasons rather than prudential or moral reasons—
roughly, reasons relevant to the truth of one’s belief that p rather than reasons relevant to 
the personal or moral goodness of believing that p.6 For example, if a lawyer’s believing 																																																								5	Linda	Zagzebski	has	argued	that	the	Gettier	problem	is	inescapable	for	any	account,	whether	internalist	or	externalist,	so	long	as	the	account	accepts	the	assumption	that	the	justification	required	for	knowledge	does	not	guarantee	truth	(see	her	“The Inescapability of Gettier Problems,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 44:174 [1994]: 65–73).		Some	might	take	this	to	be	a	good	reason	to	accept	the	analysis	just	discussed	in	the	text,	according	to	which	knowledge	is	(roughly)	conclusively	or	infallibly	justified	belief.		Others	might	take	the	lesson	to	be	that	we	should	give	up	and	take	knowledge	to	be	a	fundamental,	unanalyzable	concept.		I	do	not	have	space	to	discuss	these	views	further	here.	6	This	isn’t	quite	right.	Suppose	believing	you	will	get	well	makes	it	likely	that	you	will	get	well.	Believing	you	will	get	well	would	then	be	a	reason	relevant	to	the	likelihood	of	the	belief’s	being	true,	but	it’s	still	not	an	epistemic	reason.	We	may	need	to	add	some	condition	to	the	effect	that	the	subject	is	able	to	grasp	or	appreciate	the	relevance	of	the	reason	to	the	truth.		
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that his client is innocent will improve his ability to defend him in court, that may give 
the lawyer a reason to believe that he is innocent, but it’s not an epistemic reason, or 
epistemic justification, for the belief.7 It is not grounds or evidence for belief, even if it 
provides some other sort of reason or justification to believe.  
What do I mean by “access”? This is difficult to spell out precisely. For now I 
will just add that the relevant sort of access involves either an actual or potential 
awareness. One need not actually access or be aware of evidence E at some time in order 
to be justified in believing that p on the basis of E at that time, but E must in some sense 
be accessible to the subject by reflection alone. For example, I take it that you know or 
are at least justified in believing that Descartes wrote the Meditations. But you rarely, if 
ever, turn your attention to your reasons for believing this. Intuitively, your belief could 
still be justified so long as you have good grounds or evidence to believe that Descartes 
wrote the Meditations, grounds that you can access, and whose relevance to this belief 
you can appreciate. 
Justified belief is belief that is based on good grounds. It is not enough that I have 
good grounds to believe that some proposition p is true; I must also base my belief on 
good grounds. Suppose I believe that Descartes wrote the Mediations, and I actually have 
access to good evidence for this, but I believe it only because I heard this from Harry, 
despite knowing that he is a pathological liar. Intuitively, my belief is not justified, even 
though it easily could be. As some epistemologists put it, I have justification to believe 
this proposition—I have “propositional justification”—but I do not have a justified belief 
in the proposition—I do not have “doxastic justification.”  
The externalist claims that certain external conditions are necessary and sufficient 
for justification. Various externalist accounts have been proposed, but it will help to 
focus on a popular form of externalism for purposes of illustration: process-reliabilism.8 
Very roughly, reliabilism says that a belief is epistemically justified only if it is produced 
by a type of process that is reliable, in the sense that it has a tendency to produce true 
beliefs more often than false ones, or in the sense that “in the long run” most beliefs 
produced by this type of process are true. Reliabilists standardly add something like a “no 
defeaters” condition to avoid obvious counterexamples (in my own account given above, 
it’s condition (c)): a belief is epistemically justified if and only if it is produced by a 
reliable process, and the subject has no access to defeaters. For example, suppose that I 
look outside my window and I seem to see a unicorn. Let’s stipulate that I really do see a 
genuine unicorn, and that my belief that this is a unicorn is produced by a highly reliable 
perceptual process. But suppose that I have excellent (though misleading) reasons to 
believe that there are no real unicorns. Or suppose that my doctor has warned me that my 
medication causes hallucinations in a small percentage of cases. I would surely not be 
justified in believing that this is a unicorn, despite the fact that I form the belief on the 
basis of a reliable perception.  
Notice that the “no defeaters” condition is itself an external condition. It is one 
thing to require that I not possess reasons to think my belief is false or the source 
untrustworthy; it is quite another to require that I also possess reasons to think my belief 
																																																								7	This	example	is	from	Stewart	Cohen’s “Justification and Truth,” Philosophical Studies 46:3 (1984): 
279–95. 8	See	A.	Goldman,	Justification and Knowledge,	for	a	defense	of	reliabilism.	
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is true. The internalist accepts the latter as a requirement for justification, while the 
externalist rejects it.  
 
Defending Internalism 
Why do I think internalism is true? Basically, because it is, upon reflection, intuitively 
correct. Part of the motivation for internalism was already given above: many examples 
seem to show that true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, and that some positive 
epistemic property, which we called “epistemic justification,” is also required. And, as 
we reflect on the possible cases, what seems to be missing from them is rational belief. 
Intuitively, in order for my belief to be rational, or for me to be rational in holding it, I 
must have good reasons to take the proposition to be true.  
But this is, at best, an inconclusive defense of internalism, for one might claim 
that the problem in the examples discussed so far is not a lack of or defect in rationality, 
at least not in any sense of the term that requires access to good grounds. Rather, the 
problem is that these beliefs have no lawful, causal, or objective connection to the truth.  
However, upon further reflection, we see that internalism yields intuitively correct 
classifications for various cases we can think about, cases that externalism, in contrast, 
has trouble with. I do not want to claim here that these examples constitute conclusive 
support for internalism, or that externalists cannot or have not given interesting and 
potentially plausible responses to them. However, when we consider such examples as a 
whole, we see that the motivation for internalism is both straightforward and powerful, 
and that a plausible treatment of such cases is a significant challenge to those who deny 
internalism. First, consider the following case: 
 
Normal Perception: René is sitting by a fire, holding and reading from a book of 
philosophy, and has the corresponding experiences: he seems to be sitting, seems 
to see and feel the warmth of the fire, seems to see and feel the book in his hands, 
is reading such-and-such words, and so on. His perceptual and cognitive faculties 
are all in good, functioning order. René believes, on the basis of these experiences 
or appearances, that he is reading a book by the fire. (He is thus very much like 
you.)   
 
From a commonsense standpoint, René is justified in his beliefs. He holds the sorts of 
ordinary beliefs that you do, and on a similar basis. It seems that externalists are able to 
account for the fact that René’s beliefs are justified, for he satisfies the standard external 
conditions for justification: his beliefs are the result of perceptual and cognitive processes 
that are in good working order, and so the belief-forming processes are reliable. 
Internalists too are apparently able to account for the fact that René’s beliefs are justified, 
for he seems to satisfy the internalist conditions: Much like you, René has access to his 
perceptual states, to the visual sensations of the fire and the book, to the feeling of heat 
and the feeling of the book in his hands, and these provide strong reasons for his beliefs.  
But now compare the following case: 
 
Evil Demon: René has exactly the same experiences or apparent perceptions as in 
the Normal Perception case. He believes, on the basis of these experiences, that he 
is reading a book by the fire. But all René’s perceptual beliefs are false, for he is 
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the victim of a powerful and evil demon who produces misleading perceptual 
experiences in him. (He is thus “internally” exactly like the René of the Normal 
Perception case, and “internally” very much like you.) 
 
René’s belief that he is reading by the fire is surely just as justified in this case as in the 
first. It may help to put yourself in his situation, and imagine an undetectable switch from 
the Normal Perception case to the Evil Demon case: suppose that a powerful demon or 
alien has abducted you in your sleep and is now manipulating your brain directly, giving 
you the apparent perceptions you now have. Nothing would ever seem different from 
your own point of view, for the demon produces in your brain just the changes that are 
normally present when you wake up, have coffee, sit in a chair to read a book, and so on. 
And suppose that you suddenly wake up in the middle of reading this sentence or the 
next, and you seem to see a demon or alien before you, and the pod that he has kept you 
in. You are not justified now in believing you were reading a book; but surely, you were 
justified in believing it back when you were having those experiences.  
The internalist can make good sense of our intuitions in this case: in the normal 
case, and initially in the evil demon case, you have access to good reasons to believe that 
you are reading by a fire, and you have no defeaters—no clear reasons to disbelieve or 
suspend belief about this. Then there occurs a significant change in the sorts of 
experiences you have access to, and so it is not surprising that there is a change in what 
you are and are not justified in believing at that point.  
Skeptical concerns can of course be raised, even in ordinary or normal cases: as 
the challenge of responding to skeptical arguments reflect, it is difficult to explain why 
our reasons for our ordinary beliefs are as good as we initially or commonsensically take 
them to be. But to the extent that René’s belief is justified in the Normal case, it is 
justified in the second case; to the extent that his justification is shaky or defeated in the 
one case, it is in the other. And the internalist can explain why: what René has access to 
in the two cases is the same.  
The reliabilist is in a more difficult position. The external conditions that the 
reliabilist takes to be necessary and sufficient for justification are satisfied in the Normal 
Perception case but not in the Evil Demon case. René’s belief that he is reading by the 
fire is the result of a reliable belief-forming process in the first case, but not the second. 
Reliabilism thus seems to imply that the belief is justified in the first case but not the 
second case, and this is counterintuitive. It may help once again to put yourself in René’s 
position, and imagine that there is a transition from the Normal case to the Demon case. 
Reliabilism seems to imply that you go from being justified in believing that you are 
reading by the fire to being unjustified, despite the fact that nothing at all changes from 
your own perspective. In fact, you could go from being justified to being unjustified in 
the middle of reading this sentence, if the demon suddenly decides to abduct you while 
continuing to manipulate your brain directly, causing in your brain just the states and 
processes normally caused by the continued activity of reading. Intuitively, your belief 
would be just as justified, even though it is no longer produced by a reliable belief-
forming process.9   
It might be tempting to amend the reliabilist view to accommodate the Evil 
Demon case in the following way: a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a 																																																								9	S.	Cohen	raises	this	“new	evil	demon	problem”	for	externalism	in	his	“Justification and Truth.”	
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process that is reliable in our world, and the believer has no defeaters.10 So, to find out if 
René’s belief is justified in the Evil Demon case, we should ask whether it is produced by 
a process that is in fact reliable in our world. If it is, then we can treat René’s belief in the 
hypothetical case as justified as well. However, there are two problems with this account. 
First, it seems we should allow for the possibility, in principle, that our world turns out to 
be a demon world. Perhaps the demon has been uninterested in deceiving us up until 
now. Our ordinary perceptual beliefs would go from being justified to unjustified 
according to the account, and that is counterintuitive. Second, we surely want to allow for 
the possibility that some beliefs be justified even though they are formed by processes 
that do not exist, or are not reliable, in our world. Perhaps certain creatures could have 
existed whose belief-forming processes are nothing like the processes that are reliable in 
our world; we don’t want to just rule out even the possibility that any such beliefs be 
justified!   
Let us consider another pair of cases:  
 
Reliable Testimony: Jude would like to go fishing. He believes, on the basis of 
Leila’s testimony, that there are some largemouth bass in the neighborhood pond. 
Leila is generally very reliable when it comes to such things. Jude has no reasons 
to distrust Leila; in fact, he has very good reasons to trust her.  
 
Unreliable Testimony: Jude would like to go fishing. He believes, on the basis of 
Leila’s testimony, that there are some largemouth bass in the neighborhood pond. 
Jude has no reasons to distrust Leila; in fact, he has very good reasons to trust her. 
But Leila is actually not at all trustworthy when it comes to such things, or indeed 
much else. She likes to make things up and impress people, and is quite good at 
seamlessly weaving truths and lies, and picking her lies selectively so that they 
are hard to disprove. Only about half of what she says is true.  
 
Intuitively, Jude is equally justified in the two cases. And once again, the internalist has a 
straightforward explanation: Jude has access to the same reasons for belief, and no access 
to defeaters. His first-person perspective on matters is the same in both cases. He may 
come to have some reason to distrust Leila’s testimony, or lower his confidence in her 
trustworthiness, if he finds out that there are no largemouth bass in the pond. But absent 
defeaters, it seems he is justified in his belief.  
Skeptical concerns can of course be raised with respect to our reliance on 
testimony. Perhaps there are skeptical arguments that seem to show that our reliance on 
testimony is on shaky ground, and that our epistemic reasons for trusting others’ 
testimony are not as good as we might initially think. But to the extent that Jude’s belief 
is justified in the Reliable Testimony case, it is justified in the Unreliable Testimony 
case; to the extent that Jude’s reasons are shaky or too weak in the one case, they are in 
the other. Internalism thus makes good sense of the intuition that Jude is equally justified 
(or unjustified) in the two cases.  																																																								10	Goldman	(Justification and Knowledge)	considers	this	revision	to	the	view,	though	as	a	response	to	a	different	sort	of	case—the	fairy	case—that	we’ll	discuss	below.		He	anticipates	and	attempts	to	address	the	first	of	the	objections	raised	here,	but	not	the	second.	
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If, on the other hand, an external condition like reliability were necessary for 
justification, we would have to say that Jude’s belief is unjustified in the second case. 
The reliabilist might attempt to avoid the problem by saying that testimony of this sort is 
a generally reliable way for Jude to form beliefs, even if Leila’s testimony is not.11 But 
we can imagine a more extreme case of unreliable testimony, where all the people Jude 
talks to are unreliable testifiers, but that they conspire to keep Jude in the dark, much as 
Truman Burbank’s family, friends and neighbors (in the movie The Truman Show) 
manage (for a while) to keep him in the dark about the fact that he is the star of a popular 
TV show. Intuitively, Jude’s belief would be just as justified as in the Reliable Testimony 
case, despite not satisfying the external condition of reliability.  
The above cases seem to undermine the claim that reliability (and similar external 
conditions) are necessary for justification, and they support the sufficiency of the 
internalist’s proposed conditions.12 Let’s now consider a case that seems to show that 
external conditions are not sufficient for justification, and so supports the necessity of 
access to reasons.13  
 
Wishful Thinking: Some of Aria’s beliefs are due to wishful thinking. For 
example, she believes that she will live to be over a hundred years old (she is 
presently forty), and has the belief only because she really wishes it were true. 
She has no reasons for or against the truth of the belief, and no reasons for or 
against the claim that her belief is produced by wishful-thinking.  
 
Aria is unjustified in her belief. For the internalist, the problem is that Aria’s belief is not 
based on any good reason to think she will live that long. For the externalist, her belief is 
not the output of a reliable belief-forming process. But now consider this case: 
 
Fairy: As in the above case, Aria believes that she will live to be over a hundred 
years old, and has the belief only because she really wishes it were true. She has 
no reasons for or against the truth of the belief, and no reasons for or against the 
claim that her belief is produced by wishful-thinking. Unbeknownst to her, 
however, there exists a powerful fairy intent on making Aria’s wishes come true. 
 
Intuitively, Aria’s belief is not justified. We can imagine that her belief went from being 
unreliable to reliable because the fairy took a liking to her, and decided to grant her wish 
by ensuring her longevity. But Aria’s belief is unjustified nonetheless. So the satisfaction 
of external conditions, like reliability and the absence of defeaters, are not sufficient for 																																																								11	This	raises	difficult	questions	for	the	reliabilist:	at	what	level	of	generality	should	we	think	of	the	processes	that	are	responsible	for	the	belief?	Which	is	the	relevant	process	type:	Leila’s	testimony	regarding	fish?	Leila’s	testimony	in	general?	The	testimony	of	people	in	my	neighborhood?	The	testimony	of	people	in	general?	But	let’s	assume	that	this	“generality	problem”	can	be	solved	somehow.	For	more	on	this,	see	Earl	Conee and Richard Feldman’s, “The generality problem for 
reliabilism,” Philosophical Studies 89:1 (1998): 1-29.  12	As	we	have	seen,	the	“no	defeaters”	condition	is	an	external	condition	that	internalists	and	externalists	accept.		13	For	other	counterexamples	to	the	sufficiency	of	external	conditions	for	justification,	see	Laurence 
BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:1 (1980): 53–
73. 
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justification. Internalists can explain why: Aria never had good reasons for her belief, and 
still doesn’t.  
The reliabilist might attempt to avoid the problem by saying that a belief is 
justified if and only if it is produced by a process that is reliable in our world, and the 
subject has no defeaters. Since wishful thinking is not reliable in our world, when we 
consider the hypothetical case we could say that this belief is not justified. But we have 
already critiqued this suggestion above in discussing the Evil Demon case.14  
Finally, externalists might attempt to give a different response. They might claim 
that our intuitions in the Evil Demon and Fairy cases are misleading because we are 
confusing responsibility or blame with epistemic justification. In the Evil Demon case, 
René is not to blame for his beliefs; in the Fairy case, Aria is to blame for believing on 
the basis of wishful thinking. We are misled by this to say that in these cases René is 
justified while Aria is not.15      
However, this still doesn’t seem to get things right. Compare René’s situation in 
the Evil Demon case with another demon victim, George, who is caused to have false 
beliefs directly, without having any perceptual experiences or cogent reasoning. We 
should not blame George for his beliefs—he doesn’t have much, if any, control over 
them. Both René and George are blameless, and their beliefs are not based on reliable 
processes. But René is intuitively justified in his belief while George is not. Internalists 
would point out that René has, either within his perspective or accessible from it, good 
reasons to believe, while George does not. Once again, reflecting on these cases, we see 
that internalism—but not externalism—provides a plausible, intuitively correct account 
of epistemic justification.  
 
Conclusion 
Internalist and externalists tend to agree that knowledge requires what I have called 
“epistemically justified” belief, that is, belief that is appropriately related to the truth or 
probability of one’s belief, but they disagree about what this relation to truth or 
probability involves. The internalist claims a belief is justified if and only if it is based on 
good, accessible grounds—i.e., good reasons to think the belief true or probable—and the 
subject has no defeaters. The externalist claims that a belief is epistemically justified if 
and only if certain external conditions are satisfied. We focused on reliabilism for 
illustration, according to which a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a 
reliable or truth-conducive belief-forming process, in the absence of defeaters; no 
condition of access to grounds is necessary. We found that when we reflect on a range of 
cases and ask whether the subjects are epistemically justified, internalism yields 
intuitively correct answers for those cases, while reliabilism and, arguably, other forms of 
externalism, yield some strongly counterintuitive results. We should therefore conclude 
that justified belief requires rational belief, belief based on good, accessible grounds.16   
 
 																																																								14	A.	Goldman	(Justification and Knowledge)	tentatively	suggests	this	sort	of	revision	to	the	view.		See	related	note	10	above.		15	For	a	response	of	this	sort,	see	Alvin	Goldman, “Strong and Weak Justification,” in Philosophical 










In his essay, Stephen Hetherington presents a challenging dilemma for the internalist that 
turns on a question: Does epistemic justification require that the subject have internal 
access to—i.e., be aware, or at least able to become aware of —some evidence and of its 
being good evidence? Whatever the answer, it seems to lead to trouble for the 
internalist.17 
 
The Apparent Internalist’s Dilemma 
If the internalist answers “no”—e.g., by requiring access to the evidence but not to its 
being good evidence—then the view does not satisfy classical internalist thinking and is 
not interestingly different from externalism. As Hetherington puts it, “the evidence and 
its pertinent goodness may as well be an epistemically external circumstance for you” (p. 
--).  
If the internalist answers “yes,” then the requirement becomes so demanding that 
none of our beliefs would be justified, for we could never do enough reflecting to satisfy 
the requirement. The problem arises from the fact that it might seem to me that I have 
good evidence for some claim or proposition P when, in fact, this “seeming” is an 
illusion. In order to be justified, I must be able to rule out this possibility, or at least set it 
aside as mere possibility, an unlikely possibility. Of course, if I am to do so rationally and 
not just dogmatically, I need good evidence to think that I have good evidence to think 
that P. But, again, it might merely seem to me that I have good evidence to think this. 
This need for good evidence will keep recurring at every one of an endless hierarchy of 
levels. Our finite minds cannot satisfy such a requirement. Hetherington concludes that 
“internalism imposes upon would-be justified believers an unsatisfiable commitment….” 
(p. --). In short: if internalism is true, then global skepticism, the thesis that none of our 
beliefs are justified, is true.  
Why is this bad news for internalism? Though Hetherington doesn’t directly answer 
this question, one straightforward answer is that global skepticism is false: I am now 
justified in believing at least some things (e.g., that something exists, that I exist, that 
1+1=2, that there are no square circles). It follows that internalism is false. 
Notice that the argument is not just that if internalism is true, then very young 
children, animals, and any beings without the ability to access and appreciate their 
evidence don’t have epistemically justified or rational beliefs—an implication many 
internalists are happy to accept. Nor is the argument just that if internalism is true, then 
we are not justified in believing anything about the world outside our own minds. This 																																																								
17 For a similar dilemma, see Michael Bergmann’s Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic 
Externalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). For a reply, see my “Classical Foundationalism and 
Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism,” Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 391-410. 
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external-world skepticism is a radical form of skepticism, but it is still not as obviously 
false as global skepticism. Moreover, internalists have argued that we have access to 
good grounds to reject external-world skepticism.18   
However, if Hetherington is right that internalism implies that no belief can be 
justified, that would be a clearer, stronger reason to reject internalism. I will therefore 
focus on this argument, though some of what I say may suggest responses to these other 
versions of the objection that internalism is too demanding.  
 
Responding to the Dilemma 
In defending internalism, I characterized the access required for justification in terms of 
actual or potential awareness (i.e., ability to become aware) of good grounds, grounds 
whose relevance to the belief the subject can appreciate. So, I do accept something at 
least roughly like Hetherington’s characterization of internalism as the view that 
justification requires access to good evidence and to its being good evidence. We have 
just seen an argument that this leads to an utterly unsatisfiable standard. How do I reply? 
First of all, I don’t require that the justified subject have a seeming or awareness that 
the evidence is good evidence. An appreciation of the relevance of evidence to what one 
believes, or an appreciation of the evidence’s pertinent “goodness” for some belief, need 
not involve literally applying the concept of good evidence. All that is required is that the 
subject be aware of something’s making true or making probable what one believes. 
Now, in a sense, to be aware of something’s making true or making probable what one 
believes just is to be aware of its being good evidence for what one believes! I do take 
justification to require access to the fact that one’s evidence is good evidence in this 
sense. But I don’t want to require, in addition to this, that the subject must also have and 
apply a concept “good evidence.” Moreover, “good evidence” is often used to mean 
something different or something more. For example, we might use it to mean something 
that is publicly accessible, or that would be accepted as true in legal or scientific contexts, 
or that is a reliable source of knowledge. I don’t want to claim that the justified subject 
must be aware of having good evidence in any of these senses.  
It will help to consider some examples of awareness of something’s making true, or 
making probable, what one believes. (a) I am experiencing a taste, and am directly aware 
of this taste’s matching, fitting, or corresponding to my concept salty. I am thus aware of 
this taste’s making it true that this is salty. (b) I am having thoughts and experiences, and 
I am aware that my having thoughts or experiences requires the existence of a self; the 
fact that I have thoughts or experiences implies, entails, or makes true that I (some person 
or self) exist. (c) I seem to be hearing and (successfully) singing along to a song, and I am 
aware that this makes it probable that I’ve heard it before. Our awareness of these 
relations can make a difference to our perspective on the truth or probability of what we 
believe. In these cases, the evidence and its pertinent goodness are not external 																																																								
18 See Laurence BonJour’s, “Foundationalism and the External World” Philosophical Perspectives 13 
(1999): 229-49; Michael Huemer’s, “Serious Theories and Skeptical Theories: Why You are Probably Not 
a Brain in a Vat,” Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 1031–1052; and my “Skepticism and Spatial Objects,” 
(forthcoming), International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 
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circumstances for the subject, even if they don’t literally involve the subject’s conceiving 
of the evidence as “good evidence.”   
Hetherington might grant much of this, at least for sake of argument, but claim that it 
doesn’t avoid the sort of problem he is raising. For it might merely seem to me that 
something makes true or makes probable what I believe. This possibility must also be set 
aside, which would require further evidence, and so lead to a similar, unsatisfiable 
regress.  
However, an internalist can deny that the sort of awareness required for justification 
must take the form of a seeming or appearance state that could possibly be illusory. A 
seeming or appearance state is a representation or involves a representation, and as such 
it can go wrong. It seems to me that I see a coffee mug on the table, but it is possible that 
it is a mere illusion, or that I am dreaming. But a long tradition of internalists hold that 
awareness can take a non-representational form. To be directly (non-representationally) 
aware of something is to stand in a real relation to it. When it comes to a real relation, it 
can’t exist without its “relata” or the things related. I cannot, for example, be aware of my 
having a headache without the existence of the headache. This applies to awareness of 
relations: I cannot be directly aware of a relation of correspondence, entailment, or 
probability without this relation actually existing. I cannot be aware, for example, of my 
experience’s corresponding or fitting with my concept of a headache without the 
experience’s actually corresponding to the concept. If our awareness of the evidence and 
its pertinent goodness can take this form—being a direct, non-representational awareness 
of a making-true or making probable relation—then it cannot be illusory in the way 
representational states can. This allows us to challenge the objection that internalism’s 
requirement is unsatisfiable. 
  One might object that even if I do have a direct awareness of this sort, don’t I also 
need to be aware that I have this direct awareness, or know that this awareness is not 
illusory, is not a mere seeming, etc.? I don’t think so. Internalism requires that the subject 
be able to be aware of some evidence and (on my view) its pertinent goodness; it does 
not, or need not, require that one be aware of the fact that one is aware of the evidence 
and its pertinent goodness. Although some forms of internalism have claimed that 
justified subjects must be aware or know that they satisfy conditions of knowledge or 
justification, an internalist can coherently reject that requirement, including any 
requirement that subjects know or be aware that they satisfy internalist conditions of 
knowledge.  
 
 
 
